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DALLAS ASSEMBLY/CHARTER 100/ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
19 JANUARY 1988

CIA AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY  
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INTRODUCTION

OVER THE YEARS, PUBLIC VIEWS OF CIA AND ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY HAVE BEEN SHAPED PRIMARILY BY MOVIES, TELEVISION, NOVELS, NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS BY JOURNALISTS, HEADLINES GROWING OUT OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES, EXPOSES BY FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND ESSAYS BY EXPERTS WHO HAVE NEVER SERVED IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AND BY SOME WHO HAVE SERVED AND STILL NEVER UNDERSTOOD OUR ROLE. WE ARE SAID TO BE AN INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT AND YET ARE THE MOST VISIBLE, MOST EXTERNALLY SCRUTINIZED AND MOST PUBLICIZED INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. WHILE WE SOMETIMES ARE ABLE TO REFUTE PUBLICLY ALLEGATIONS AND CRITICISM AGAINST US, USUALLY WE MUST REMAIN SILENT. THE RESULT IS A CONTRADICTORY MELANGE OF IMAGES OF CIA AND VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR REAL ROLE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO TRY TO ILLUMINATE, AND I HOPE EXPAND, YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THIS ROLE TAKES THREE BROAD FORMS:

- FIRST, CIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COLLECTION, ANALYSIS AND DISTRIBUTION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION TO THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE AND MANY OTHER DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.
- SECOND, CIA IS CHARGED WITH THE CONDUCT OF COVERT ACTION, THE ONE AREA WHERE WE IMPLEMENT POLICY. THIS IS A SUBJECT SO COMPLEX AND SO CONTROVERSIAL AS TO REQUIRE SEPARATE TREATMENT AT ANOTHER TIME, ANOTHER PLACE.
- THIRD, AND MOST SIGNIFICANT, CIA'S ROLE IS PLAYED OUT IN THE INTERACTION, PRIMARILY IN WASHINGTON, BETWEEN CIA AND THE POLICY COMMUNITY. IT IS IN THE DYNAMICS OF THIS RELATIONSHIP THAT THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF CIA ARE DETERMINED -- WHETHER CIA'S ASSESSMENTS ARE HEEDDED OR NOT, WHETHER CIA'S INFORMATION IS RELEVANT AND TIMELY ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL, AND WHETHER CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH POLICYMAKERS FROM ISSUE TO ISSUE AND PROBLEM TO PROBLEM, IS SUPPORTIVE OR ADVERSARIAL. IT IS THIS DYNAMIC INTERACTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY THAT IS THE LEAST WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IT IS THIS AREA THAT I WILL FOCUS ON TODAY.

WHAT THEN, DOES CIA DO? BECAUSE OF THE MEDIA'S FOCUS ON COVERT ACTION, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY FIRST OF ALL THAT OVER 95 PERCENT OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. ABOUT THREE PERCENT OF CIA'S PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION.

### COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

NOW, IF WE ARE NOT SPENDING MOST OF OUR TIME AND MONEY ATTEMPTING TO OVERTHROW GOVERNMENTS, WHAT EXACTLY DOES CIA DO? CIA DEVOTES THE OVERWHELMING PREPONDERANCE OF ITS RESOURCES TO MONITORING AND REPORTING ON DAY TO DAY DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD, AND DETERMINING AND RESPONDING TO POLICYMAKERS' LONGER RANGE REQUIREMENTS FOR INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS.

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FINDS ITS WAY TO THE POLICYMAKER IN SEVERAL WAYS:

- FIRST, INTELLIGENCE ON DAY TO DAY EVENTS AND DEVELOPMENTS AROUND THE WORLD IS PROVIDED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS DAILY OR EVEN SEVERAL TIMES A DAY.
- SECOND, THE CIA CONTRIBUTES ANALYSIS TO POLICY PAPERS DESCRIBING BOTH EVENTS AT HAND AND POTENTIAL

OPPORTUNITIES OR PROBLEMS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

NEARLY ALL NSC AND SUB-CABINET MEETINGS BEGIN WITH AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING.

- THIRD, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE MAKING OF POLICY. THESE ESTIMATES ARE THE MOST FORMAL EXPRESSION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS. ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT BOTH CONTRIBUTE TO AND COORDINATE ON WHAT IS SAID IN THESE ESTIMATES.
- FOURTH, POLICYMAKERS RECEIVE SPECIALIZED ASSESSMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES. CIA'S ASSESSMENTS OR RESEARCH PROGRAM IS THE PRODUCT OF THE LARGEST INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ORGANIZATION IN THE WORLD. THE RANGE OF ISSUES IS BREATHTAKING -- FROM STRATEGIC WEAPONS TO FOOD SUPPLIES; EPIDEMIOLOGY TO SPACE; WATER AND CLIMATE TO THIRD WORLD POLITICAL INSTABILITY; MINERAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; SOVIET LASER WEAPONS TO REMOTE TRIBAL DEMOGRAPHICS; CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION TO COMMODITY SUPPLIES; AND MANY, MANY MORE.

CIA-POLICY RELATIONSHIPS

SO FAR, SO GOOD. WHAT I HAVE JUST REVIEWED IS A TEXTBOOK DESCRIPTION OF THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE. IT IS NEAT, UNAMBIGUOUS, CLINICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL, EVEN COMMENDABLE -- AND HIGHLY MISLEADING. WHAT ABOUT USERS WHO LOOK NOT FOR DATA OR UNDERSTANDING, BUT FOR SUPPORT FOR DECISIONS ALREADY MADE; OR THOSE WHO SELECTIVELY USE OR MISSTATE INTELLIGENCE TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC DEBATE OVER POLICY; OR USERS WHO LABEL INTELLIGENCE THEY DISLIKE AS TOO SOFT, TOO HARD OR COOKED; OR INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS WITH THEIR OWN AGENDAS OR BIASES; OR THE IMPLICATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY OF A CIA DIRECTOR HELD AT TOO GREAT A DISTANCE FROM THE PRESIDENT OR ONE WHO IS HELD TOO CLOSE; OR THE FRUSTRATIONS OF CONSTANTLY CHANGING EVALUATIONS, OR ANALYSIS THAT IS JUST PLAIN WRONG; OR THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE AS A POLITICAL FOOTBALL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS OR BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES? THE ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR OF OFFICIALS IN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES THAT LIE BEHIND THESE AND MANY SIMILAR ISSUES AND THE INTERACTION AMONG THEM COMPRISE THE DYNAMIC OF THE RELATIONSHIP -- WHAT PROFESSOR YEHOSEFAT HARKABI OF HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM DESCRIBES AS "THE INTELLIGENCE-POLICYMAKER TANGLE."

THE FACT IS THAT, OVER THE YEARS, THE POLICYMAKER AND THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER HAVE CONSISTENTLY -- AND WITH

FRIGHTENINGLY FEW EXCEPTIONS -- COME TOGETHER HUGEY IGNORANT OF THE REALITIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF EACH OTHER'S WORLD -- PROCESS, TECHNIQUE, FORM AND CULTURE. CIA OFFICERS CAN TELL YOU IN EXCRUCIATING DETAIL HOW FOREIGN POLICY IS MADE IN EVERY COUNTRY IN THE WORLD SAVE ONE -- THE UNITED STATES. BY THE SAME TOKEN, AS SUGGESTED BY PROFESSOR HARKABI, THE UNHAPPINESS OF INTELLIGENCE PEOPLE SWELLS "WHEN THEY COMPARE THE SOPHISTICATION AND ADVANCED METHODS EMPLOYED IN COLLECTION OF THE INFORMATION AND THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE AGAINST THE CAVALIER FASHION OR IMPROVISATION WITH WHICH POLICY DECISIONS ARE MANY A TIME REACHED."

THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE -- OF CIA -- IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. WHILE THIS CONFERS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES, ABOVE ALL INDEPENDENCE, SUCH AUTONOMY ALSO IMBUES THE CIA-POLICY COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIP WITH A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSARIAL AS WELL AS SUPPORTIVE CONTENT. AND, THE POLICYMAKER HAS A LONG LIST OF GRIEVANCES, MANY LEGITIMATE, SOME NOT.

-- POLICYMAKERS LEGITIMATELY WANT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION THAT WILL INFORM AND GUIDE THEIR TACTICAL DAY TO DAY DECISIONMAKING. IN SOME AREAS, WE CAN AND DO MEET THEIR NEEDS. FOR EXAMPLE, IN 1980, THANKS TO A VERY BRAVE MAN, WE WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE POLICYMAKERS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE STEP BY STEP PREPARATIONS FOR THE

IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. IN EARLY 1986, WE WERE ABLE TO DOCUMENT IN EXTRAORDINARY DETAIL ELECTORAL CHEATING IN THE PHILIPPINES. THERE ARE EVEN SOME AREAS WHERE OUR INTELLIGENCE IS SO GOOD THAT IT REDUCES POLICYMAKERS FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM FOR MANEUVER. YET, I WOULD HAVE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE ARE COUNTRIES AND ISSUES IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES WHERE SUCH TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE -- MOST OFTEN POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE -- IS SORELY DEFICIENT AND POLICYMAKER COMPLAINTS ARE JUSTIFIED.

-- IT WILL NOT SURPRISE YOU THAT VERY FEW POLICYMAKERS WELCOME CIA INFORMATION WHICH DIRECTLY OR BY INFERENCE CHALLENGES THE SUCCESS OR ADEQUACY OF THEIR POLICIES OR THE ACCURACY OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS. INDEED, DURING THE VIETNAM WAR, A CONSTANT REFRAIN FROM POLICYMAKERS WAS, "AREN'T YOU GUYS ON THE TEAM?"

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE POLICYMAKER IS OFTEN SUSPICIOUS THAT WHEN CIA'S ANALYSIS SUGGESTS POLICY IS FAILING OR IN DIFFICULTY, THESE CONCLUSIONS ARE, WITH MALICE, WIDELY CIRCULATED BY THE AGENCY FOR USE AS AMMUNITION BY CRITICS OF THE POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WITH CONGRESS OR WITH THE PUBLIC.



-- MANY POLICYMAKERS BELIEVE CIA ALLOWS ITS BIASES TO DOMINATE ITS REPORTING. WHO WOULD DISAGREE THAT CIA OFFICERS HAVE VIEWS AND BIASES, AND THAT THEY TRY TO PROMOTE THEM? BUT, CIA IS NOT MONOLITHIC; THERE IS A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS INSIDE ON VIRTUALLY EVERY ISSUE. INDEED, THE INTERNAL DEBATES ARE FIERCE AND SOMETIMES BRUTAL -- AFTER ALL, THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH. IT IS NOT A PLACE FOR THE FAINT-HEARTED. WE HAVE ELABORATE PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWING ASSESSMENTS TO TRY TO FILTER OUT INDIVIDUAL BIAS AND MAKE OUR REPORTING AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE. AND WHEN WE SEND OUT A PROVOCATIVE ANALYSIS BY AN INDIVIDUAL WE TRY ALWAYS TO IDENTIFY IT AS A PERSONAL VIEW.

BEYOND THIS, IS THERE AN INSTITUTIONAL BIAS THAT AFFECTS OUR WORK? PROBABLY, IN SOME AREAS, IN THE BROADEST SENSE, AND PERHAPS BASED ON EXPERIENCE. AS AN INSTITUTION, WE ARE PROBABLY MORE SKEPTICAL OF SOVIET INTENTIONS THAN MOST; MORE CYNICAL ABOUT THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHEN CONTRASTED TO THEIR ACTIONS, OVERT AND COVERT; MORE DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE EASE AND SPEED WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES CAN USUALLY AFFECT DEVELOPMENTS OVERSEAS; AND, FAIRLY CONSISTENTLY, WE WILL TEND TO SEE PERILS AND DIFFICULTY WHERE OTHERS DO NOT.

-- POLICYMAKERS' IMPATIENCE WITH INTELLIGENCE -- WITH CIA  
-- IS INTENSIFIED BY THE FACT THAT WE ARE SOMETIMES  
WRONG IN OUR ANALYSIS AND FORECASTS, AND WE OFTEN  
CHANGE OUR ASSESSMENTS BASED ON NEW ANALYSIS OR NEW  
INFORMATION. WE DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE ERROR GRACEFULLY,  
AND OFTEN DO NOT FOREWARN POLICYMAKERS OF REVISED VIEWS  
BEFORE THE INFORMATION HITS THE STREET. A POLICYMAKER  
WHO HAS MADE DECISIONS BASED ON ONE ASSESSMENT ONLY TO  
SEE IT CHANGE OR TO FIND THAT IT WAS WRONG WILL NOT  
THINK FONDLY OF US OR SOON WISH AGAIN TO PROCEED ON OUR  
ASSURANCES OR ASSESSMENTS.

-- CIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS ALSO IS A SPECIAL  
PROBLEM FOR POLICYMAKERS FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND IT  
PROFOUNDLY INFLUENCES OUR ROLE. VIRTUALLY ALL CIA  
ASSESSMENTS GO TO THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE  
COMMITTEES. MOST GO ALSO TO THE ARMED SERVICES,  
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. IN  
1986, CIA SENT SOME 5000 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO  
CONGRESS AND GAVE MANY HUNDREDS OF BRIEFINGS. ALL THIS  
IS NEW IN THE LAST DECADE OR SO. AS A RESULT, AND  
THANKS TO THEIR STAFFS, MANY SENATORS AND  
REPRESENTATIVES ARE OFTEN BETTER INFORMED ABOUT CIA'S  
INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS ON A GIVEN SUBJECT THAN THE  
POLICYMAKER. AND THAT INTELLIGENCE IS OFTEN USED TO

CRITICIZE AND CHALLENGE POLICY, TO SET ONE EXECUTIVE AGENCY AGAINST ANOTHER, AND TO EXPOSE DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN AN ADMINISTRATION.

MOST SPECIALISTS WRITING ABOUT THE CHANGED BALANCE OF POWER IN RECENT YEARS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, CITE WATERGATE AND VIETNAM AS PRIMARY CAUSES. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A THIRD PRINCIPAL FACTOR -- WHEN CONGRESS OBTAINED ACCESS TO INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION IN THE MID-1970S ESSENTIALLY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

THIS SITUATION ADDS EXTRAORDINARY STRESS TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND POLICY AGENCIES. POLICYMAKER SUSPICION OF CIA USING INTELLIGENCE TO SABOTAGE SELECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IS OFTEN NOT FAR BELOW THE SURFACE. AND NOT A FEW MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ARE WILLING TO EXPLOIT THIS SITUATION BY THEIR OWN SELECTIVE USE OF INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTS THEIR VIEWS. THE END RESULT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE CONGRESSIONAL HAND IN POLICY DEBATES AND TO HEIGHTEN GREATLY THE TENSIONS BETWEEN CIA AND THE REST OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

NOW, LET ME TURN TO CIA'S ROLE AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICYMAKER AS SEEN FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT.

-----LET ME SAY AT THE OUTSET THAT IN EVERY ADMINISTRATION DURING WHICH I HAVE SERVED THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF SENIOR POLICYMAKERS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND ABOVE) WHO WERE AVID USERS AND READERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND WHO AGGRESSIVELY SOUGHT CIA ANALYSIS AND VIEWS. THEY DEDICATED CONSIDERABLE TIME TO TALKING ABOUT SUBSTANTIVE AND POLICY PROBLEMS WITH US. WE HAVE HAD UNPRECEDENTED ACCESS IN THIS ADMINISTRATION FROM THE PRESIDENT ON DOWN, ESPECIALLY FOR ANALYSIS, AND DAILY CONTACT WITH THE MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THEY HAVE OFTEN DIRECTLY TASKED US AND OFFERED REACTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE THEY READ -- AND THEY HAVE READ A GREAT DEAL. THIS IS TRUE ALSO OF THEIR SENIOR SUBORDINATES, WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED ENORMOUSLY TO IMPROVING THE RELEVANCE, TIMING, AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR ANALYSIS AND OTHER SUPPORT. IT IS A DYNAMIC, HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP, EVEN THOUGH IT IS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON CURRENT ISSUES.

-- THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH CURRENT REPORTING IS, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, A MAJOR PROBLEM. IF, AS I HAVE BEEN TOLD, THE AVERAGE TENURE OF AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY IN GOVERNMENT IS 21 MONTHS, A SHORT TERM FOCUS IS

UNDERSTANDABLE BUT LAMENTABLE, AND, ULTIMATELY, VERY COSTLY TO OUR COUNTRY. ONE OF OUR GREATEST CONCERNS OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN THE UNWILLINGNESS OR INABILITY OF MOST POLICYMAKERS TO SPEND MUCH TIME ON LONGER RANGE ISSUES -- LOOKING AHEAD SEVERAL STEPS -- OR IN HELPING TO GUIDE OR DIRECT OUR EFFORTS.

-- IN PART BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT TIME SPENT ON INTELLIGENCE, TOO MANY POLICYMAKERS EARLY ON HAVE UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO THAT, WHEN DISAPPOINTED, TURN TO SKEPTICISM WHETHER WE CAN DO ANYTHING.

-- IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE OVER THE YEARS THAT THE POLICYMAKERS' RESPONSE TO INTELLIGENCE THEY DISAGREE WITH OR FIND UNPALATABLE MOST OFTEN IS TO IGNORE IT; SOMETIMES, THEY WILL CHARACTERIZE IT AS INCOMPLETE, TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED OR AS INCOMPETENT (AND THEY ARE SOMETIMES RIGHT); AND OCCASIONALLY THEY WILL CHARGE THAT IT IS "COOKED" OR THAT IT REFLECTS A CIA BIAS. IN 21 YEARS IN INTELLIGENCE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD A POLICYMAKER (OR ANYONE ELSE FOR THAT MATTER) CHARACTERIZE AS BIASED OR COOKED A CIA ASSESSMENT WITH WHICH HE AGREED. ON VIETNAM, VARIOUS ASPECTS OF SOVIET POLICY AND BEHAVIOR, ANGOLA, LEBANON, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EMBARGOES OR SANCTIONS, AND OTHER ISSUES OVER THE

YEARS, OUR ANALYSTS HAVE DRAWN CONCLUSIONS THAT DASH COLD WATER ON THE HOPES AND EFFORTS OF THE POLICYMAKERS. SOMETIMES WE HAVE BEEN WRONG, BUT ON PROBLEMS LARGE AND SMALL WE HAVE NOT FLINCHED FROM PRESENTING OUR HONEST VIEW.

POLICYMAKERS HAVE ALWAYS LIKED INTELLIGENCE THAT SUPPORTED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO, AND THEY OFTEN TRY TO INFLUENCE THE ANALYSIS TO COME TO CONCLUSIONS THEY WANT. THEY ASK CAREFULLY PHRASED QUESTIONS; THEY SOMETIMES WITHHOLD INFORMATION; THEY BROADEN OR NARROW THE ISSUE; ON RARE OCCASIONS, THEY EVEN TRY TO INTIMIDATE. THE PRESSURES CAN BE ENORMOUS. THIS IS WHERE THE INTEGRITY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, BOLSTERED BY A NATURAL TENDENCY TO RESIST PRESSURE AND AN OFTEN ADVERSARIAL BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP, COMES INTO PLAY TO PROTECT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ASSESSMENT.

A FINAL THOUGHT. TO ATTEMPT TO SLANT INTELLIGENCE NOT ONLY TRANGRESSES THE DEEPEST ETHICAL AND CULTURAL PRINCIPLE OF CIA, WE ALL KNOW IT WOULD ALSO BE FOOLISH -- IT WOULD PRESUPPOSE A SINGLE POINT OF VIEW IN AN ADMINISTRATION AND WOULD IGNORE THE REALITY OF CONGRESSIONAL READERSHIP. INDEED, IN MY OPINION, THE SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE WITH CONGRESS IS ONE OF THE SUREST GUARANTEES OF CIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND

OBJECTIVITY. AS DIRECTOR WEBSTER HAS SAID, "WE INTEND TO 'TELL IT AS IT IS,' AVOIDING BIAS AS MUCH AS WE CAN, OR THE POLITICIZATION OF OUR PRODUCT. POLICYMAKERS MAY NOT LIKE THE MESSAGE THEY HEAR FROM US, ESPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW. MY POSITION IS THAT IN THE PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, WE WILL PROVIDE THEM FOR THE USE OF POLICYMAKERS. THEY CAN BE USED IN WHOLE OR IN PART. THEY CAN BE IGNORED, OR TORN UP, OR THROWN AWAY, BUT THEY MAY NOT BE CHANGED."

#### CONCLUSION

WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED HERE IS THE REALITY OF CIA'S ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. I HAVE TRIED TO GO BEYOND THE MECHANICS AND THE HEADLINES TO IDENTIFY THE STRESSES, TENSIONS, RIVALRIES, ENDURING COMPLAINTS AND RELATIONSHIPS -- THE PULLING AND HAULING, DAY IN AND DAY OUT, REAL LIFE IF YOU WILL -- THAT DETERMINE CIA'S ROLE AND ITS IMPACT. CIA'S AUTONOMY IS UNIQUE IN OUR GOVERNMENT, ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE LEGISLATURE IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD. OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ARE A DYNAMIC BLEND OF SUPPORT AND RIVALRY, OF COOPERATION AND CONFLICT.

THE REAL INTELLIGENCE STORY IN RECENT YEARS IS THE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT, WITH HELP FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS, IN THE QUALITY, RELEVANCE AND TIMELINESS OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE POLICYMAKER -- A STORY THAT HAS BEEN NEGLECTED IN PREFERENCE TO CONTROVERSIAL COVERT ACTIONS, PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIA AND THE CONGRESS, AND SPY SCANDALS. WE UNDERSTAND THIS POLITICAL REALITY, BUT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT AMERICANS KNOW THAT OUR PRIMARY MISSION REMAINS THE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION. THIS IS OUR PRIMARY ROLE IN THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THE PRESIDENT, THE POLICY COMMUNITY, AND THE CONGRESS -- ALBEIT SOMETIMES WITH CLENCHED TEETH -- DEPEND UPON US, TASK US, AND LOOK TO US MORE EACH DAY. WE ATTRACT AMERICA'S BRIGHTEST YOUNG PEOPLE, WHO FIND WITH CIA EXCEPTIONALLY CHALLENGING, HONORABLE, AND CONSISTENTLY FASCINATING CAREERS. IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF HIS RECENT HISTORY OF CIA, JOHN RANELAGH STATES, "IN ITS MOMENTS OF ACHIEVEMENT AS WELL AS CONDEMNATION, THE AGENCY WAS A REMINDER THAT IT WAS A FAITHFUL INSTRUMENT OF THE MOST DECENT AND PERHAPS THE SIMPLEST OF THE GREAT POWERS, AND CERTAINLY THE ONE THAT EVEN IN ITS DARKEST PASSAGES PRACTICED MOST CONSISTENTLY THE VIRTUE OF HOPE."

THE UNITED STATES HAS THE FINEST GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. FAITHFUL TO THE CONSTITUTION AND THE



LAWS, IT HELPS TO SAFEGUARD OUR FREEDOM AGAINST OUR ADVERSARIES AND HELPS THE POLICYMAKER UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THE OFTEN DANGEROUS WORLD AROUND US. CIA IS TRULY AMERICA'S FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE -- ITS EYES AND EARS. AND OUR DEEPEST COMMITMENT, TO BORROW A PHRASE USED BY ERIC LARRABEE TO DESCRIBE GEORGE MARSHALL, IS "TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER."